

Message Text

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ACTION NEA-07

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 EUR-08 EA-06 INR-05 NSC-05

SP-02 PM-03 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 L-01 IO-06 ACDA-10

EB-04 /072 W

-----127521 171132Z /14

P R 170956Z MAY 78

FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8056

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USLO PEKING

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN

CINCPAC

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 4018

LIMDIS

CINCEUR AND CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLADS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PEPR, AF, PK, TU, IR, SA

SUBJECT: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY OF COUP IN AFGHANISTAN

REF: A. TEHRAN 4547, B. KABUL 3419 (NOTAL) C. KABUL 3666 (NOTAL)

1. ALL THE HARD EVIDENCE THAT WE HAVE ABOUT SOVIET ACTIVITIES
IN AFGHANISTAN SINCE THE APRIL 27-28 COUP AND ABOUT PAST RELATION-
SHIPS BETWEEN THE NEW AFGHAN LEADERS AND THE SOVIET UNION LEAD
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INESCAPABLY TO THE CONCLUSION THAT UNDER ITS NEW LEADERSHIP,
AFGHANISTAN HAS FALLEN INTO THE SOVIET ORBIT. SO FAR, WE HAVE
ONLY THE WORDS OF THE NEW LEADERS THAT THEY INTEND TO PURSUE
A NONALIGNED POLICY. THEIR GROWING ACCEPTANCE OF SOVIET INVOLVE-
MENT IN THEIR POLITICAL AND MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE DOES NOT
SUPPORT THEIR WORDS.

2. MOREOVER, I REMAIN CONVINCED THAT HAVING ACHIEVED SUCH A LONGSTANDING GOAL OF INCORPORATING AFGHANISTAN INTO THE SOVIET SPHERE OF INFLUENCE, MOSCOW WILL DO EVERYTHING IT CAN TO KEEP IT THERE. AND, I SEE NO INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL FACTORS AT THE MOMENT WHICH COULD THWART MOSCOW'S INTENTION.

3. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL-POLITICAL EFFECTS OF THIS DEVELOPMENT ARE NATURALLY BEING FELT IN OTHER PLACES, ESPECIALLY PAKISTAN, BUT ALSO IN IRAN, CHINA, SAUDI ARABIA, AND ELSEWHERE. I NOTE A COMMON THEME IN THESE OTHER COUNTRIES THAT THEY CANNOT COUNT ON THE UNITED STATES TO PREVENT FURTHER SOVIET ADVANCES IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD. THIS DESPONDENCY ITSELF CONTRIBUTES TO AN ATMOSPHERE FROM WHICH THE SOVIETS CAN BENEFIT, AND WHICH CAN ENCOURAGE THEM TO EXPLOIT FURTHER THEIR BRIDGEHEAD HERE.

4. VITAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ESPECIALLY IN IRAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF REGION, ARE INVOLVED IN THIS SITUATION. I WOULD THINK THAT OUR CREDIBILITY IN PEKING IS ALSO INVOLVED.

5. IN THE LIGHT OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS, I WARMLY SECOND THE RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN (REF A). I THINK IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE UNDERTAKE A CAREFUL REVIEW OF OUR POLICY TOWARDS THIS REGION, ESPECIALLY TOWARD THE REGIONAL CENTRO COUNTRIES, WITH A VIEW TO BOLSTERING THEIR POLITICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND MILITARY POSITIONS. I ALSO AGREE THAT WE SHOULD CONSULT

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WITH OUR EUROPEAN AND JAPANESE ALLIES, AND WITH THE CHINESE, ON WHAT THEY, AS WELL AS WE, CAN DO IN THESE REGARDS. AN EARLY RESOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR REPROCESSING DISPUTE WITH PAKISTAN IS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE.

6. I AM CERTAIN WE CAN DEVISE WAYS FOR SHORING UP OUR FRIENDS IN THIS REGION WHICH WILL NOT BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH A STRATEGY OF MAINTAINING A RELATIONSHIP WITH AFGHANISTAN WHICH WILL PROVIDE THE AFGHANS WITH SOME ALTERNATIVE TO RELIANCE ON THE SOVIET UNION, SHOULD THEY WISH TO HAVE AND/OR BE PERMITTED BY THE SOVIETS TO HAVE SUCH AN ALTERNATIVE.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: SPHERE OF INFLUENCE, INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 17 may 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978KABUL04018
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780207-0796
Format: TEL
From: KABUL
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780550/aaaabqjt.tel
Line Count: 106
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: a6263e9c-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION NEA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: ONLY
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 2
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: ONLY
Reference: 78 TEHRAN 4547, 78 KABUL 3419, 78 KABUL 3666
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 23 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2668910
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY OF COUP IN AFGHANISTAN
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, AF, UR, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/a6263e9c-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014